Research spotlight : Are criminals rational? by Aaron Steelman
E
conomists use models to explain a wide variety of phe-
nomena. Most of the models assume that people are
rational—that they act purposively and respond to
incentives. This assumption applies to people in all walks of
life, from investors to politicians to criminals. 
David Friedman, an economist at Santa Clara University
and author of Hidden Order: The Economics of Everyday Life,
nicely summarizes the way economists look at crime: “A
burglar burgles for the same reason I teach economics—
because he finds it a more attractive profession than any
other. The obvious conclusion is that the way to reduce bur-
glary—whether as a legislator or a homeowner—is by raising
the costs of the burglar’s profession or reducing its benefits.”
One might say, “That’s ridiculous. I don’t break into
people’s homes because
it’s morally wrong, not
because I have decided
that it isn’t worth the
risk.” This is probably
true for most people—
and it may be the most
significant reason why we
don’t have more crime
than we do. But that
doesn’t necessarily mean
that such law-abiding cit-
izens haven’t done a
benefit-cost analysis of
their own.
“Crime also has asso-
ciated with it psychic costs. Many people do not commit
crimes because they believe doing so is ethically wrong. And
the feelings we have about what is right and wrong are impor-
tant,” writes University of Chicago economist Gary Becker.
In other words, guilt is a real cost. You may not have to
answer to the law for committing burglary, but you will have
to answer to your conscience.
Still, we need legal sanctions to protect us from those less
scrupulous: criminals and would-be criminals. What those
sanctions should be and how they should be enforced are
matters of opinion. But, generally, economists would say that
if you want less crime, you should stiffen penalties and expend
more resources on enforcement—though the exact mix is a
matter of debate, since empirical studies differ over the rel-
ative effectiveness of these two forms of deterrence. You
should also keep in mind that the optimal amount of crime
is not zero. Eradicating all crime would be extremely costly
and probably would require draconian measures that most
people would reject as unworthy of a free society.
If criminals are indeed rational, where is the evidence?
Economists Jac C. Heckelman of Wake Forest University and
Andrew J. Yates of the University of Richmond use a novel
data set to test this hypothesis: penalty statistics from the
National Hockey League (NHL).
During the 1999-2000 season, the NHL experimented
with a new system: Some games had two referees, others just
one. There were more penalties called during two-referee
games, meaning that players were less likely to get away with
breaking the rules than they were in a one-referee game. But
what about deterrence? Did the additional referee prevent
players from committing penalties that they otherwise would
because they knew their chance of being caught was greater?
It doesn’t seem so. “The number of referees is not statisti-
cally significant in any of
the regressions, suggest-
ing that players do not
commit fewer infractions
in response to the
increased number of ref-
erees.”
Does this give us
reason to doubt the
rational criminal hypoth-
esis? Perhaps. But there
are at least three reasons




the lack thereof, are imperfect and may not capture the full
effects of an additional referee. Second, it’s not clear that all
teams would respond to an additional referee in the same
way. For instance, teams that play relatively well in “short-
handed” situations— penalty periods in which they have
fewer players on the ice —might not be as concerned about
being called for penalties because the costs to them are not
as high. (Conversely, the additional referee should have a
greater deterrent effect for teams that play relatively poorly
shorthanded.) Third, and most important, hockey is a game
of reaction. Decisions have to be made on the fly, with little
time for serious contemplation. So the conditions are very
different than when one is planning a burglary.
“Because many sports infractions take place during the
heat of competition and may be accidental or retaliatory in
nature rather than planned in advance, the act of commit-
ting a sports infraction may be more analogous to a crime
of passion than a calculated benefit-cost analysis performed
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